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Responding to Terrorism? Human Rights Organization Shaming and Terrorist Attacks

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ABSTRACT

Why do Human Rights Organizations (HROs) target or "shame" countries for human rights abuses? The literature using country-level factors to explain why one country is likely to be targeted over another is growing but many questions still remain. Terrorist activity in a country should have a positive effect on the amount of shaming directed at a country. HROs are in the publicity business and have organizational interests to shame states already receiving attention. Findings show that there is a connection between certain types of transnational terrorist incidents occur in a country and the amount of HRO shaming of governments, even after accounting for the human rights practices within the state.

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How do human rights organizations (HROs), like Amnesty International (AI) or Human Rights Watch (HRW) decide which countries to target when reporting human rights violations? Does a country's experience with terrorism factor into the attention it receives from HROs?[1] Do these organizations consider the amount of terrorism in a country when they "name and shame" countries for abuses within their borders? Or, since terrorism is conducted by violent non-state actors, is the amount of terrorism ignored by HROs, who are more traditionally focused on violence by state actors, like police and military forces?[2]

Some critics say that HROs over-target countries where terrorism occurs; terrorist organizations are typically not criticized for their human rights abuses but the regime is "shamed and blamed" for the overall human rights situation within the state, even if violence is part of a larger dynamic where a state is being pushed to protect its population.[3] If this is the case, then it is possible that a state's actions, taken to protect its citizens in the wake of terror, are given undo criticism.[4] The founder of HRW, Robert L. Bernstein, published a scathing assessment of the organization's treatment of Israel in a *New York Times* op-ed piece, saying that the organization "has lost critical perspective on a conflict in which Israel has been repeatedly attacked by Hamas and Hezbollah, organizations that go after Israeli citizens and use their own people as human shields."[5]

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Others say that HROs give states a free pass for human rights abuses after terrorism attacks. For instance, former board of director of AI, Francis Boyle, has been outspoken about AI's bias in favor of the United States and the United Kingdom. He argues this bias led to a lack of attention to areas where both terrorism and widespread human rights abuses occurred in the 1980s, including Lebanon, South Africa, and Northern Ireland. Dr. Boyle argues that the organization did not focus on these issues and others like them because AI is:

> primarily motivated not by human rights but by publicity. Second comes money. Third comes getting more members. Fourth internal turf battles. And then finally, human rights, genuine human rights concerns. To be sure, if you are dealing with a human rights situation in a country that is at odds with the United States or Britain, it gets an awful lot of attention, resources, man and womanpower, publicity, you name it, they can throw whatever they want at that. But if it's dealing with violations of human rights by the United States, Britain, Israel, then it's like pulling teeth to get them to really do something on the situation.[6]

In May of 2014, a group letter by over 100 scholars, including two Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, was sent to the head of HRW, criticizing its "close ties the U.S. government" and its lack of attention to recent human rights abuses by the United States, Venezuelan, and Syrian governments, all abuses that had occurred during periods of terrorism and violence in these countries.[7]

HROs try to appear to be politically impartial; it is critical to their legitimacy and authority in the field.[8] However, a growing literature within international relations finds that HRO targeting and attention definitely has a geopolitical element to it, with research finding that conflict-related deaths and aid and security ties to the United States and the United Kingdom influence press releases by AI.[9] Other research has found that organizational factors influence which cases and states receive HRO attention.[10]

Beyond the anecdotal, what impact does terrorism have on shaming by HROs? Existing theoretical work has not addressed this question, despite a growing literature on the determinants of HRO strategies and behavior, which have examined other forms of political violence. We argue that terrorism can lead to *more* shaming of countries by HROs, even after controlling for the human rights situation within the state. This increase could occur through three different mechanisms. First, increased shaming of countries experiencing terrorism could align with the goal of human rights promotion and advocacy attention by HROs. Second, counterterrorism policies enacted after terror attacks may lead to government human rights abuses, again triggering attention by HROs. Third, poor underlying human rights conditions within a state can fuel both terrorism and HRO shaming.[11]

Although some of our logic could apply to other forms of political violence, we believe that terrorism is a tactic that is unique in its potential capturing of HRO attention, largely due to the role that media and popular attention plays in the logic of terrorist attacks.[12] In line with the larger literature on terrorist and HRO motivations, both types of non-state actors are in the marketing business. Non-state actors need publicity; unfortunately, terrorism is an excellent marketing tool to attract worldwide attention for groups that cannot otherwise get popular support.[13] Although the message of human rights may resonate more readily with a popular audience than the messages of terrorist organizations, HROs also have organizational desires to remain in the spotlight so that they can continue to receive support and donations to maintain the existence of the organization which may lead them to focus more on issues and states that should increase publicity.[14] Therefore, HROs may use the strategy of global media shaming more readily on states where terrorist events have

occurred. Given the adage "if it bleeds, it leads," HROs should target countries disproportionality after terrorism events because this shaming will get the press and attention that HROs need for organizational survival.

Similarly, HROs want to focus on issues that donors care about.[15] The wealthiest donors of HROs are often Western states and individuals, many of whom have become increasingly interested in terrorism violence in the last decade.[16] Therefore HROs should be especially attentive to instances of terrorism where Westerners are hurt. This information would be especially salient on non-Western states where there had been Western terrorist victims.

Using an updated dataset on shaming by 1,166 HROs, we find strong support for our theoretical argument. Even when human rights situation in a country is accounted for, HRO shaming increases in states where there are terrorism attacks, especially attacks with Western victims in non-Western countries.

These findings are important for a theoretical understanding of terrorist groups and HROs, who share a need for media attention. Publicity is also a crucial need for terrorists in their struggle with a state actor. If HROs, as an indirect effect of their shaming activities, assist in this publicity, then these findings draw attention to how one type of non-state actor (terrorist groups) can benefit from the behavior of another type of non-state actor (HROs) who have very different agendas.[17] Our theoretical understanding of the processes through which terrorist groups utilize outsiders in achieving policy objectives has not focused on the use of outside nonviolent non-state actors; this behavior is similar to the creation and working of other advocacy networks, including the human rights advocacy network.[18]

In order to build a theoretical understanding of HROs, this study reiterates that HROs are strategic organizations, which, while acting to bring attention to human rights violations, also take actions that ensure publicity, donations, and organizational survival.[19] Obviously, an HRO's first goal is to report information on human rights abuses. However, holding constant the level of human rights abuses in a country, on average, organizational desires for donor funding and attention contribute to an overabundance of shaming directed at states where terrorism has occurred. Whether this strategy ultimately benefits human rights achievement is tangential to the argument. Theoretically, this study argues that HROs do not shame only the worst human rights offenders, but also the states more likely to reflect their organizational publicity and donor needs.

Below, we outline the extant literature on HRO shaming and incorporate this literature into ideas of terrorist groups and the need for publicity. We then outline our theoretical argument and the empirical implications. The research design and statistical results follow.

Naming and Shaming

In the last 15 years there has been an explosion of literature exploring HROs and their activities. HROs proactively work to pressure governments to change their behavior. In the name of human rights promotion, organizations often work to gather data on human rights violations, educate individuals of their rights, organize political protests, draft legislation, and counsel the victims of human rights abuse.[20] This on-the-ground involvement of HROs is referred to as "local empowerment"; organizations are involved locally within a repressive regime and their activities are designed to empower the local population to demand human rights improvement.[21]

In addition to localized activities, another pathway through which HROs work is "shaming and blaming" or "naming and shaming" activities.[22] Here, organizations use information about human rights abuses within a locale to issue press releases and give interviews to the international media. For example, from 1990 to 2000, the HRO HRW appeared in Reuters Global News Service 739 times concerning human rights abuses within various countries. These media reports typically concern a call to action or comment from the organization to a particular state. For example, on 11 January1990 AI publically criticized Saudi Arabia for forcing false confessions from violent political dissidents.[23]

Organizations "shame" or target a state with the hope that this publicity will encourage a regime to stop its abusive practices and improve human rights. Theoretically, there are two ways shaming leads a regime to stop abusing its population. First, shaming encourages local citizens to demand their rights "from below."[24] Citizens not aware of the abuses may join collective movements after seeing the shaming in the press and then pressure the regime to stop the practice or face consequences during elections. Second, shaming is used to get third party state leaders, intergovernmental officials, and other interested actors to join the HRO and pressure a state "from above."[25] Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink argue that shaming increases the foreign policy pressure a regime faces, leading the regime to rethink the cost-benefit analysis that led to the use of repression.[26] Therefore, shaming makes third party actors aware of the repression, leading them to call on the regime to stop their actions or face foreign policy consequences. A regime may first make "tactical concessions" that result in less repressive practices on the ground.[27] Once a regime begins making these concessions, however, if domestic opposition to the regime is high, the state can begin moving toward behavior consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[28] Through both local empowerment and international shaming, HROs are a critical link in the canonical "boomerang" pattern of advocacy behavior.[29] The regime feels increased pressure both locally and internationally that leads to improved human rights practices.

An example of this process is the end of Argentina political disappearances during the late 1970s.[30] Work by AI shed light on the huge number of disappearances in Argentina. This attention brought pressure on third party states to act to stop the regime in Argentina, which ultimately led to a cut in aid by the US president.[31] Under this international pressure, Argentina reacted:

> to permit the IACHR [Inter-American Commission on Human Rights] to conduct an on-site investigation in Argentina in December 1978 in exchange for a U.S. promise to unblock Export-Import Bank funds. In the period that followed this invitation, the human rights situation in Argentina improved and the number of disappearances declined significantly.[32]

Initial cross-national research has shown that HRO shaming leads to costly foreign policy consequences for the targeted state and, often, human rights improvement. Foreign policy consequences from shaming include increased likelihood of economic sanctions.[33] Similarly, shaming reduces foreign direct investment.[34] However, shaming alone does not lead to an improvement in human rights practices.[35] In a sample of Latin American countries, the combination of shaming and foreign policy consequences, leads to more human rights protection.[36] Shaming coupled with on-the-ground presence of HROs leads to improvements in human rights practices[37] and can limit governmental killings.[38]

Given the importance of shaming in an understanding of how human rights improvements occur, what determines when shaming occurs? Less research has been conducted on

this topic.[39] The existing literature shows that shaming is more likely when human rights abuses are high. This finding makes much intuitive sense: organizations want to shame the worst offenders. In a groundbreaking study concerning the issuance of press releases and background reports by AI, researchers find that AI does issue is undergoing an armed conflict.[40] However, organizations are also dependent on the information available to them and their ability to get this information into the hands of the localized public; there are also more AI reports in states where there is more overall media coverage.[41] Similarly, AI is more likely to issue Urgent Action reports, a type of shaming, when there are more HROs present within the country.[42] In short, the ability to both gather and disseminate information through the media and other advocacy actors are important determinants of shaming activities. In an environment where organizations do not have much information on human rights abuses, we do not know much about the cognitive processes or shortcuts HRO officials use in deciding who to target.

Despite their principled motivations, HROs are also strategic organizations, concerned with their donor and member desires, organizational livelihood, and likelihood of success.[43] These additional factors are part of the "information politics" game that organizations must play in order to receive the resources and attention that are necessary for advocacy movements.[44] Similarly, organizations operate where international attention will likely be successful for the organization itself and for the existing goals of the overall movement.[45] This sentiment is reflected in the literature on development international nongovernmental organizations; at the margins, organizations often focus on areas where donors want them to creating a "NGO scramble" to receive donor funds.[46]

U.S. military aid is associated with more AI background reports because HROs want to focus attention where powerful third party actors are already interested, leading to more material resources for themselves and their cause.[47] The literature does not show that overall aid to a country increases shaming.[48] Additionally, the "informational politics" incentives do not translate to an exaggeration of abuses.[49] Although there is some evidence that these dynamics may influence what issues and countries are focused on, little consensus exists as to the effect of information politics on shaming intensity and very little research has been conducted examining the particular factors which could increase shaming attention.

While the existing shaming literature discussed above make an important contribution to our understanding of shaming activities, there is an important component missing from this analysis: the activity of non-state actors confronting a targeted state. How the activities of various non-state actors impact the kind of attention that HROs pay to states is a critical missing piece in our understanding of the determinants of HRO shaming. In this article, we focus on the impact of terrorism on the shaming activity of HROs. When terrorism appears in the larger HRO literature currently, it is mostly takes two forms. First, the literature discusses the need to shame countries that are giving support to terrorist organizations (i.e., using naming and shaming as a counterterrorism tool). Second, the literature on HROs urges these organizations to not be silenced by government efforts passed as part of the "War on Terror."[50] Our contention is that terrorism has another relationship to HRO shaming. Terrorism draws the attention of HROs to a country because it is an effective media tool—and HROs are dependent on news media to publicize their work. In the section below, we lay out the relevant human rights and terrorism literature to build our argument.

Terrorism and HRO Attention

There is a large literature that ties human rights to terrorist activity. Much of this literature argues that terrorism will lead to a decline in human rights as states both respond to challenges to their authority and move to defend themselves and their citizens. However, the caveat to this argument is that terrorism may have a differential impact on different types of human rights.[51] Indeed McCauley argues that this reduction in rights for the general public is the very point of terrorism as a strategy.[52] McCauley has labeled this approach "Jijitsu politics" and argues that the point of terrorism is to provoke the state to repress the population so that population will become supportive of the very organizations that are challenging the state—by using terrorism.[53] Others suggest that human and civil rights facilitate terrorism because governments who respect human rights have less coercive control of their environment.[54] Other researchers argue that respect for human rights will make terrorism less likely because organizations will have less reason to mobilize and resist the government in the first place.[55] Although there is clearly a relationship between terrorism and human rights, the literature has not addressed whether terrorism has an influence on the promoters of human rights, namely HROs.

While there is not a wide literature on the impact of terrorism on the behavior of HROs, the same cannot be said about the relationship between terrorism and the news media. This literature points to a strong positive relationship between the two. One of the key slogans of the nineteenth century anarchist terrorist movement in describing their activity was to call it "propaganda of the deed."[56] There is also strong evidence that terrorist attacks were effective propaganda as: "The propaganda of words came to be overshadowed by the propaganda of the deed, with the result that the bloody acts of anarchists "became the talk and, to a degree, the terror of the world."[57]

This perspective was adopted by some of the earliest modern terrorism researchers who, starting in the 1970s, began arguing that a prime motivator of non-state terrorist activity is to gain a broader audience, specifically the attention of the international media. Terrorism can be seen from this perspective as "theater."[58] Indeed "getting the attention of the mass media, the public, and decision makers is the raison d'etre behind modern terrorism's increasingly shocking violence."[59] Terrorism is a useful tool that allows non-state actors to make their case to an audience that would not listen otherwise—especially if their views are not part of the mainstream.[60] In fact:

> … When terrorists strike, their deeds assure them instant media attention and, as a consequence of generous news coverage, of the general public and the government in their particular target country. Moreover, given the global nature of the contemporary communication system, the perpetrators of international and domestic terrorism also tap into the international media and thereby receive the attention of publics and governments beyond their immediate target countries as well.[61]

Even some terrorists make this argument.[62] The right attack at the right time is advocated as a key way to make the world pay attention, which one of the planners of the Munich Olympic attack clearly recognized when he said "we offered up human sacrifices to your gods of sport and television. And they answered our prayers. From Munich onwards, nobody could ignore the Palestinians or their cause."[63] Such acts spread information about the grievance, and this knowledge of the importance of the news media and publicity has been part of terrorist training in modern times.[64]

Not all attention for terrorism groups is good attention. On the one hand there is a strong argument to be made that terrorism will lead to a reduction of interest in human rights—and certainly one can make the case that this is true for governments, who often try to justify their human rights abuses as responses to terrorist threats.[65] Others have extended this argument beyond just governments and point out that the negative impact that terrorism does: "to the notion that all human life deserves respect can hardly be ignored. Terorrism lowers the standard, and encourages states and other actors similarly to disregard human rights."[66]

The public can decide to look the other way when they are in a "moral panic" motivated by fear.[67] Governments can exploit these fears in order to be more repressive and commit more human rights abuses.[68] This lack of public interest in human rights during times of terrorism may not be translated into a lack of interest by HROs, which are specifically focused on human rights and are often seen as trailblazers, bucking this trend of inaction observed in both leaders and the public.[69]

Neither the inclinations of the public nor the state actually answer the question of how terrorist activity should impact the shaming of states by HROs. If we control for regime type and repression, one might expect that terrorism should not lead to more HRO shaming. We hypothesize, however, that violent terrorist activity of non-state actors makes HROs more likely to shame a country, even controlling for state level factors that, from a human rights perspective, should be the main motivators for the shaming. Why should states be more likely to be targeted for shaming because of violence carried out by non-state actors? Non-state actors that challenge the state, including both terrorism groups and HROs, face a fundamentally unfair power equation. Usually, the state is stronger and they are weaker and figuring out how to balance that equation is a key strategic challenge for non-state actors.[70] One tactic to offset the power imbalance is to pull in actors external to the state; this is the central logic in transnational advocacy network (TAN) literature, which focuses primarily on HROs and other nonviolent advocacy groups.[71] When blocked at home, non-state actors can build ties abroad and create transnational advocacy networks that can then pressure their state opponent from outside in a way they cannot from inside. In this scenario, non-state actors send out a call, often termed a "boomerang," to external forces that then join them in their pressure on the state for their organizational goals.[72]

While there has been a reticence to draw a parallel between nonviolent and violent non-state actors, it appears that the boomerang pattern of TANs works in the context of both HROs and terrorist groups. In the same way that nonviolent organizations like HROs use media to direct attention to states in an effort to make them change their behavior, terrorist organizations can use the media to direct attention at states by killing people in these states. Therefore, "… the same dynamics that shape the behavior and strategies of nonviolent TANs are doing the same for Terrorist Activist Networks with one critical exception—the Terror TANs kill people."[73]

As recent research critical of HROs and TANs have concluded, not all issues and states receive equal attention from HROs, despite often deplorable human rights attention. In order to get the attention of HROs, domestic groups have to master the art of marketing[74] HROs want to focus on cases that will attract larger international attention and lead to success transnational advocacy efforts.

Unfortunately, terrorism is an excellent marketing tool that can be used to attract "worldwide attention" and can allow for the effective marketing of grievances about a state.[75] The attack on the Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympic games in Munich is a prime example

of terrorist organizations using the media to market their campaign to international audiences. One terrorist leader argued that Munich created a situation where "world opinion was forced to take note of the Palestinian drama and the Palestinian People imposed their presence on an international gathering that had sought to exclude them."[76] It was a lesson that many other groups learned and imitated.[77] After the assassination of Lord Mountbatten, a representative of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland was asked "…"Why did you kill that harmless old man?" The individual answering the phone replied, "Why are you calling me from New Zealand?"[78] Clearly terrorism can be an effective tool at getting attention from the media and the public.

While the shaming literature has suggested that HROs are often essential in bringing issues to the attention of the news media, especially in less well covered countries, we think the same is true in the other direction—the news media can help bring issues to the attention of HROs.[79] And, as we have argued above, terrorism is a very effective way of getting media attention.

One reason that terrorism can bring issues to the attention of HROs is that HROs are made up of humans who will pay closer attention to what they read in the news.[80] "Greater media exposure" should impact HROs like everyone else, even if that media prominence is being driven by terrorism.[81] A key reason why terrorism should influence shaming is that HROs are organizations need to maintain themselves with limited resources and, if an event is prominent in the news, it is more likely to be in the minds of potential supporters of HROs, who may be mobilized into helping the HRO as a result of increased attention.[82] For instance:

> Amnesty and Human Rights Watch also seek visibility and impact, however, and this gives them clear incentives to report more on the most pressing issues of the day. Like any advocacy organization concerned with real-world effects, the watchdogs feel compelled to respond to media interest. Supply rises with demand; the more journalists who ask about a country, the more information watchdogs will supply.[83]

There is much evidence that terrorism directs international attention. In a study comparing *New York Times* attention to the Basques from 1950 to 1996, results show that on average 93 percent of the media attention was on issues related to conflict and in many of the years 100 percent of the attention devoted to the Basques was due to conflict-related issues.[84] Perhaps even more disturbingly of the coverage related to conflict, 65 percent was related to terrorism while only 2.3 percent was related to government torture, which was thought to be endemic.[85] This argument has been made in other regions as well. While there were more than a hundred thousand victims in the Islamic world killed by Islamist terrorism, the West paid scant attention until some 4,000 Westerners joined them.[86] In short, terrorism draws attention. HROs want to garner more attention to a cause through shaming a country. This, on average, could lead to HROs shaming countries where terrorism is occurring. Thus, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1: Even after accounting for the human rights situation of a country, the more terrorist incidents in a country, the more likely that country is to be targeted for shaming by HROs.

Although we assert that terrorism generally will mean an increased likelihood of HRO shaming, even when we account for general repression within the state, we also assert that not all terrorist incidents are created equally when it comes to shaming attention. Most HROs originate in the West; most donations to HROs come from Western states and

individuals.[87] Westerners are more likely to hear about and empathize with events that involve Westerners. There is a hierarchy of global suffering and so events tied to the West will be seen as more important and more closely connected and, thus, drive more attention, while events that are further away and do not happen to Westerners are easily seen as being relevant only to the "distant other."[88]

Literature on media attention related to crime in America provides some supporting evidence as it finds a media bias favoring more media attention and overall coverage to wealthier, "whiter communities."[89] Literature on media attention and terrorism has shown that terror attacks occuring in the developing world must have more fatalities in order to draw the same amount of media attention as attacks in the United States and Western Europe.[90] This also suggests that, as the prototype or alpha "Westerner," the effect should be strongest if the victim of an attack is an American. A similar argument explains terrorist attacks against Americans:

> With global news networks dominated by Western countries, it is attractive for any terror entrepreneur anywhere in the world to inflict terror on nationals of Western countries, as this is a sure way of getting into global news. The media attention enables the terrorists to spread their ideology more easily. Thus, a successful attack on foreigners from some countries has a higher strategic value for terror entrepreneurs than a similarly successful attack on foreigners from another country or on domestic citizens.[91]

Media attention for terrorism is likely to differ from media attention for HROs. Journalists covering foreign news will often tie their view of the coverage to their nationalist perspective.[92] HROs, though, often see themselves as the voice of the voiceless and need to put themselves in the corner of the weak and highlight abuses.[93] This may lead HROs to be skeptical of the narrative of any terrorist incident even if the target is a Westerner but the heightened attention to these incidents will still drive them to pay more attention to the country and instinctively look for deeper (i.e., underlying state behavior) reasons why this attack happened. This innate skepticism can be seen in material written by AI leaders who call for us to look beyond the "War on Terror" and be suspicious of the use of the label "terrorist."[94] In 2003, AI's official policy was [poorly phrased] "…to use the word 'terrorism' only in quotes and to use 'armed opposition groups' to refer to terrorist operatives."[95]

In responding to terrorist attacks with more HRO shaming, therefore, it is likely that terrorist attacks against Western citizens will be especially likely at garnering HRO attention. Further, because of the increased attention that the media gives to attacks on Americans, these attacks should be especially likely at influencing HRO shaming.[96] Thus, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 2: Terrorist incidents targeting Westerners in a country will make that country even more likely to be targeted for shaming.

Hypothesis 3: Terrorist incidents targeting Americans in a country will make that country even more likely to be targeted for shaming.

Nonetheless, HROs garner the majority of resources from Western states and individuals and may not want to respond in the same way to terrorism in Western states given the support they get from these states. Thus, while HROs want attention they may be less likely to want to shame in response to attacks on Western states. As such, the dynamic described above would be most often provoked when terrorist attacks occur to Westerners in non-Western countries.

Below, we outline our research design for testing these hypotheses and then turn to the results of our statistical analyses.

Data

Dependent Variable

Our hypotheses require a dependent variable that captures the shaming activities of HROs. For this, we use Murdie and Davis's updated measure of the number of times HRO shaming directed at a particular state appears in Reuters Global News Service in a given year.[97] This measure was created by first identifying a list of human rights–specific INGOs in the 2008 edition of the *Yearbook of International Organizations*; 1,166 organizations were found to have a mission statement that was consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[98] The list of the names of these 1,166 organizations, together with any abbreviations or common names in other languages listed in the *Yearbook*, was used Virtual Research Associates to identify shaming events.[99] Since 1990, over 11,000 events directed at a specific country were identified using this process. To ensure that the events represent "shaming" and not "praising," we restricted our focus to only events that are considered non-cooperative on the Goldstein scale.[100] The dependent variable is a count of the number of these non-cooperative events in a country in a given year.

Independent Variables

Because we are focusing on the impact of transnational terrorism we use data from the ITERATE dataset. ITERATE contains data on transnational terrorist attacks from 1968–2004. Given the availability of data on human rights activity, data on terrorist events from 1990–2004 will be used. Transnational terror attacks differ from other terror attacks because a transnational terror attack requires that "through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramification transcend national boundaries."[101] Focusing on transnational terrorism is useful for many reasons. It reflects terrorism that is designed, by its nature, to draw an international audience. Further, it reflects the transnational nature of the HROs central to our study.

Moreover, the main benefit of using the ITERATE dataset for this article is that ITERATE denotes up to three nationalities of victims of the attacks. Using this information, we are able to differentiate between the nation of the location and the nationalities of the victims of the attack. Eight different terrorism measures are used in the analysis. The four main variables of interest are: number of terror attacks, any attack, Western victims, and U.S. victims. In this article, "Western" refers to the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. The number of terror attacks aggregates all the attacks that took place in a country-year observation. Any attack is a binary variable coded as 0 if a country experienced no terror attacks in its borders in that year and a 1 otherwise. The variable Western victims returns a count of the number of terror attacks in each country-year observation in which any of the victims were of Western descent. Likewise, the variable U.S. victims counts the number of terror attacks in which any of the victims were U.S. citizens.

The variables Western victims and U.S. victims are further disaggregated. The variable Western victim is disaggregated to include Western victims when the attack took place in a Western country (Western victim Western location) and Western victims when the attack took place in a non-Western country (Western victim non-Western location). These two variables allow us to examine if shaming of countries when Westerners are victims of terror attacks differs across countries. Similarly, the variable U.S. victims is disaggregated: U.S. victims when the attack took place on U.S. soil (U.S. victim U.S. location) and U.S. victims when the attack did not take place in the United States (U.S. victim non-U.S. location). This division will show if countries outside the United States are disproportionately punished through shaming activities when U.S. citizens are victims of terror attacks.

Summary statistics on these terrorism variables can be found in Table 1. All measures of terrorism will be lagged by one year in the analysis to ensure that we are capturing terrorist events that pre-date the shaming activity. Lagging the measure of terrorist attacks by one year ensures this outcome.

Controls

We follow Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers and Meernik et al. in identifying potential control variables.[102] First, and most importantly, we include a control for human rights within the state by using the 9-point Physical Integrity Rights Index from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset.[103] We control for regime type using the common Freedom House average imputed polity scale. Controls for the natural log of population and gross domestic product (GDP) from Maddison are included.[104] Natural log in Official Development Assistance (ODA) aid comes from the World Development Indicators.[105] The natural log of total U.S. military assistance comes from the U.S. Greenbook.[106] Data on percent killed in battle and whether there was conflict within the country year comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.[107] Data on the natural log of military personnel comes from the Correlates of War project. We include the number of human rights INGOs with a membership base within a country-year coded from the *Yearbook of International Organization*.[108] Finally, we control for media coverage by using the natural log of total news coverage in Reuters Global News Service. All specifications include a lagged dependent variable.

Methods and Results

Since the dependent variable, HRO shaming, is a count variable, a negative binomial regression model is used. A negative binomial model is preferred over a Poisson model since the

Table 1. Summary statistics for shaming and terrorism variables.

Variable	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
HRO shaming	2.15	3.95	0	64
Any terror	0.37	0.48	0	1
Terror incidents	1.51	4.99	0	102
Any Western victim	0.84	4.08	0	97
Western victim Western location	0.22	2.67	0	86
Western victim non-Western location	0.62	3.13	0	97
Any U.S. victim	0.43	2.67	0	89
U.S. victim U.S. location	0.02	0.36	0	12
U.S. victim non-U.S. location	0.41	2.65	0	89

data is overdispersed, meaning that there is more variability in the data than would be expected in a Poisson model. The Poisson model requires the restriction of the sample such that the mean of the dependent variable is equation. The mean value of HRO shaming in a country-year observation is 2.15—on average, a country is shamed by HROs just over twice a year, while the e variance of this variable is 15.6, much higher than the expected 2.15, indicating high levels of dispersion. Additionally, we clustered standard errors by country and included yearly fixed effects. This clustering allows for consideration that the amount of HRO shaming a country faces may not change vastly in short periods of time while also making the estimation of statistical significance more conservative, thus allowing for more confidence in our results. The results of the analysis can be found in Table 2.

Across models, the control variables, when statistically significant, are in the expected direction and consistent with extant knowledge about where HRO shaming is likely. HROs are more likely to shame states that are not democracies and more likely to shame states that have worse human rights records; this is as expected. Media attention in general is also associated with an increase likelihood of shaming, as is a larger military budget.[109]

As to the variables central for our hypothesis testing, first, the terrorism variables of interest are statistically significant at conventional levels in all models except Model 2, providing much support for Hypothesis 1. While Model 2 indicates that more terror attacks would lead to more shaming in a country, the relationship is not statistically significant. From Model 1, one can see that if a country experienced any terror attacks in the previous year that they are more likely to be the target of shaming by HROs. A country that experienced any terror attacks in the previous year is likely to see a 19.7 percent increase in shaming reports over a country that experienced no terrorism. All else equal the average country would expect almost 0.5 more shaming reports after experiencing any terrorism.

Next, Models 3 and 4 examine the role of terror attacks with Western victims on shaming activity by HROs, as outlined in Hypothesis 2. First, the results of Model 3 show that when a country experiences terror attacks with Western victims in the previous year, it is more likely to see increased shaming reports this year. So, while the total number of terror attacks does not increase shaming, a count of the number of attacks with Western victims does. For each additional attack with Western victims, shaming reports increase by 0.77 percent. Therefore, we would expect the amount of shaming against countries that experience terror attacks with Western victims to be about 2.6 percent higher than those countries without terror attacks with Western victims.

Next, Model 4 shows the results when the variable for counts of terror attacks with Western victims was broken down by whether or not the attack took place in any Western country. The relationship between shaming reports from HROs and terror attacks in Western countries against Westerners shows that western countries are not punished with shaming reports for terror attacks against other Westerners. However, when a non-Western country experiences an additional terrorist attack with Western victims, we still see a 0.77 percent increase in shaming reports.

Finally, Models 5 and 6 focus on the impact of terror attacks with U.S. victims, as outlined in Hypothesis 3. First, Model 5 shows that the number of terror attacks with U.S. victims in the previous year leads to more shaming events in the current year, as expected. Therefore, combining the results of Model 2 and Model 5, we see that while the total number of terror attacks does not increase shaming, the number of attacks with U.S. victims does increase shaming. Each additional terror attack with U.S. victims leads to a 0.98 percent increase in

Table 2. Impact of terror attacks on HRO shaming activities 1991−2003.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Any terror attack$_{t-1}$	0.180*					
	(0.104)					
# of terror attacks $_{t-1}$		0.006				
		0.004)				
Western victim $_{t-1}$			0.008*			
			(0.005)			
Western victim Western location $_{t-1}$				−15.48***		
				(1.02)		
Western victim non-Western location $_{t-1}$				0.008*		
				(0.005)		
U.S. victim $_{t-1}$					0.010**	
					(0.004)	
U.S. victim U.S. location $_{t-1}$						−0.007
						(0.037)
U.S. Victim non-U.S. location $_{t-1}$						0.008**
						(0.004)
Percent population killed in armed conflict	22.821	17.202	16.833	17.17	16.89	19.62
	(20.02)	(20.77)	(20.72)	(20.77)	(20.81)	(21.20)
Military expenditures (logged)	0.016*	0.159*	0.016*	0.016*	0.016*	0.009
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)
General media coverage (logged)	0.555***	0.560***	0.561***	0.560***	0.561***	0.527***
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.103)
Human rights INGO presence	0.0003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Shaming counts (lagged)	0.121***	0.122***	0.122***	0.122***	0.122***	0.104***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.031)
Physical Integrity Rights Index	−0.126**	−0.125***	−0.126***	−0.125***	−0.126***	−0.132***
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Polity	−0.112***	−0.111***	−0.111***	−0.110***	−0.111***	−0.116***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Armed conflict	0.141	0.171	0.176*	0.174*	0.177*	0.185*
	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.103)
GDP (in millions, logged)	-0.049	-0.058	-0.059	-0.059	-0.060	-0.045
	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.111)
Population (in millions, logged)	0.053	0.051	0.051	0.050	0.051	0.048
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.098)
Aid from U.S. (logged)	0.028	0.026	0.027	0.027	0.027	
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	
Military personnel (logged)	−0.063	−0.049	−0.048	−0.047	−0.047	−0.035
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	1,343	1,343	1,343	1,343	1,344	1630

*$p < 0.1$.
**$p < 0.05$.
***$p < 0.01$.

shaming activities. Therefore, we would expect the amount of shaming against these countries with terror attacks with U.S. victims to be 2.6 percent higher than those countries without terror attacks with U.S. victims.

Next, the variable for counts of terror attacks with U.S. victims was disaggregated by where the attack took place in Model 6. The variable for aid from the United States was dropped from the regression so that observations from the United States could be included. The coefficient on U.S. victim U.S. location is insignificant; the United States is not penalized with shaming for terror attacks in the United States with U.S. victims. On the other hand, the coefficient for U.S. victim non-U.S. location is positive and statistically significant. If a country other than the United States experiences one additional terror attack with U.S. victims, then the

number of shaming reports for that country will increase by 0.83 percent. Therefore, for the average country with terror attacks against U.S. victims, one could expect the number of shaming events to increase by 2.2 percent overall.

Conclusions

HROs, like AI or HRW, respond in their work targeting states (i.e., "shaming") to the work carried out by terrorist organizations. This finding holds after accounting for the level of repression in a state and the overall media attention the state receives. Why would nonviolent supporters of human rights, recipients of the Nobel Prize even, respond to the workings of groups whose tactics include violence and killing people? HROs need attention for organizational survival and respond to cases that will get them attention. Since terrorism is can be used to increase publicity, it should be no surprise that HROs use this publicity in their own efforts to garner international attention. The finding is consistent with our current understanding of how HROs operate and their organizational interests in survival.[110]

These findings suggest overlap between the motivations of terrorist groups and HROs. While this overlap has been suggested in the literature, it had not been thoroughly examined empirically.[111] Here, we argue that nonviolent non-state actors (HROs) may utilize the actions of their violent counterparts (terrorist groups) in determining which states to strategically focus their attention on to reach their organizational goals, including monetary goals and international attention to their efforts. Previous literature on organizational biases in the shaming behavior of HROs has not extended this logic to the responses of HROs to other non-state actors and their actions.[112] As a first step to understanding how non-state actors can influence each other in their strategic interactions with states, we find that terrorism, especially terrorism against likely donors in likely non-donor states, leads to increases in HRO shaming activities. Future research in this vein could examine whether other behaviors of violent non-state actors influence HRO shaming decisions or direct advocacy with legislative bodies. Future work could also examine whether terrorist groups are more likely to receive consolidatory actions from states where HRO shaming has been high.

In short, HROs, like other non-state actors, must be public relations specialists, focusing on only those issues and states most "ripe" for international action. This often results in an over-focus on states where terrorism has occurred, especially terrorism against Westerners. This sober reality requires more attention by social scientists and activists alike.

Notes

1. We define terrorism in this project in line with the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) project. As such, we are focusing on the use or threat of the use of force for political purposes that is intended to influence opinions in individuals that did not experience the use of or threat of violence directly. See Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, Jean M. Murdock, Peter A. Flemming, 2011, "International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), 1968–2010." Available at http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17278, Harvard Dataverse, V1 (2011). We restrict our theoretical focus to only terrorist activities carried out by non-state actors; terror conducted by state actors fits within the common definition of human rights abuse. Further, we discuss non-state groups as terrorist groups in this article if they are using terrorism.

2. In this project, a human rights organization is any internationally focused organization that is non-profit, not controlled by a government, and has a mission in line with the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights. These organizations could also be called human rights international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs).

3. By "shaming and blaming," we are referring to the common tactic of HROs to target a country negatively in the popular press. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, "Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem," *International Organization* 62 (2008), pp. 689–716.

4. Good examples of critiques of HROs and their lack of attention to terrorism include governments, other nongovernmental organizations, and even HRO workers themselves, as shown above. For example, many governments have critiqued HROs for not understanding the complexities of counterterrorism and the threats states are under. U.S. assistant secretary of state under Reagan, Thomas O. Enders, sent an open letter to Amnesty International (AI) on this subject in 1982 concerning critiques against policies in Guatemala. The Israeli organization NGO-Monitor is a perennial critic of HRO targeting in the Middle East. And, recently, Amnesty International workers have even spoken out on AI's relationship with those suspected of terrorism. See National Public Radio, "Is Amnesty International Supporting a Jihadist?" 27 February 2010. Available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124156482 (accessed 31 August 2015); Pascal Vennesson and Nikolas M. Rajkovic, "The Transnational Politics of Warfare Accountability: Human Rights Watch versus the Israel Defense Forces," *International Relations* 26(4) (2012), pp. 409–429; Bernard Weinraub, 1982. "US Considers Guatemala Arms Aid." *New York Times*. 24 November 1982. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/24/world/us-considers-guatemala-armsaid.html (accessed 31 August 2015).

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